

Disappearing Routine Jobs: Who, How, and Why?

Matias Cortes, Nir Jaimovich, Henry Siu

York University, University of Zurich, University of British Columbia

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Background

Job Polarization

- Declining share of employment in ***routine occupations***
 - Limited in scope, performed by following well-defined instructions
 - Tend to be in the middle of the wage distribution
- Decline argued to be due to technological progress
(Autor-Levy-Murnane, 2003; Autor-Katz-Kearney, 2006; Goos-Manning, 2007)

This paper

- **Who** the loss of routine job opportunities is affecting most in the US since the 1980s
- **How** these demographic groups have adjusted in terms of employment/occupation
 - Implications of this adjustment for overall labor trends
- **Why?**
 - Quantitative role of automation in the decline of routine employment in neoclassical framework

Preview of Findings

- **Who?**

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- *Routine Cognitive*: young and prime-aged women with intermediate levels of education

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- **How** have they have adjusted?

- Increased propensity for **non-employment** and for employment in (low-paying) **non-routine manual** occupations
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● Why?

- Basic neoclassical framework **struggles to account for joint decline** in routine employment and associated rise in non-routine manual employment and non-employment

Data

Data

- Monthly CPS (IPUMS)
- Civilian, non-institutionalized population
- Age 20–64
- Exclude agriculture/resource occupations

Occupation Groups (e.g. Acemoglu-Autor 2011)

- **Non-Routine Cognitive:** public relations manager, physician, financial analyst, aerospace engineer, computer programmer, economists
- **Routine Cognitive:** secretary, bank teller, travel agent, retail salesperson, mail clerk, office support worker, data entry keyer
- **Routine Manual:** machine operator, machine tender, fabricator/assembler, welder, mechanic, cement mason, dressmaker, butcher
- **Non-Routine Manual:** janitor, bus-boy, gardener, bartender, manicurist, home health aide, personal care aide

Changes in Routine

	Pre	Post	Total	Difference		
				Group Size	Propensities	Interaction
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
1979-2014						
NRC	21.5	28.2	+6.7			
RC	17.3	16.1	-1.2			
RM	23.2	15.1	-8.1			
NRM	8.4	12.3	+3.9			
Not Working	29.6	28.3	-1.3			
1989-2014						
NRC	24.7	28.2	+3.5			
RC	19.6	16.1	-3.5			
RM	21.0	15.1	-5.9			
NRM	9.6	12.3	+2.7			
Not Working	25.2	28.3	+3.1			

Decomposition

- What accounts for the changes in the probabilities?
 - *Observable*: changes in demographic composition?
 - *Unobservable*: changes in “propensity” to work in Routine...
 - for particular demographic groups?
- Decomposition into 24 groups:
 - **Age**: 20-29 (young), 30-49 (prime-aged), and 50+ years old (old)
 - **Education**: less than HS, HS, some post-secondary, college +
 - **Gender**: male and female

Changes in Routine

	Pre (1)	Post (2)	Total (3)	Difference		
				Group Size (4)	Propensities (5)	Interaction (6)
1979-2014						
NRC	21.5	28.2	+6.7	+9.7	-2.9	-0.0
RC	17.3	16.1	-1.2	+0.6	-2.0	+0.3
RM	23.2	15.1	-8.1	-5.2	-5.7	+2.7
NRM	8.4	12.3	+3.9	-1.9	+6.6	-0.8
Not Working	29.6	28.3	-1.3	-3.1	+4.0	-2.2
1989-2014						
NRC	24.7	28.2	+3.5	+6.3	-2.7	-0.1
RC	19.6	16.1	-3.5	+0.3	-3.9	+0.2
RM	21.0	15.1	-5.9	-3.5	-4.0	+1.6
NRM	9.6	12.3	+2.7	-1.7	+4.7	-0.3
Not Working	25.2	28.3	+3.1	-1.4	+5.9	-1.3

The Who

- Determine the relative importance of each demographic group:
 - Is total fall disproportionately due to certain groups?
 - How much is it fall in their share or change in propensity?

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- Determine the relative importance of each demographic group:
 - Is total fall disproportionately due to certain groups?
 - How much is it fall in their share or change in propensity?
- **Approach:** Compute, for each group g and labor market state j ,

$$\frac{w_{g1}\pi_{g1}^j - w_{g0}\pi_{g0}^j}{\bar{\pi}_1^j - \bar{\pi}_0^j}$$

The Who: RM

Table: Fraction of Δ in RM accounted for by demographic groups, 1979-2014

	Males			Females		
	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>
Less Than High School	10.26	19.60	18.66	3.60	8.41	5.60
High School Diploma	30.86	14.88	-4.03	7.39	6.62	0.30
	<i>All Ages</i>			<i>All Ages</i>		
Some College		-13.55			-2.88	
At Least College		-4.41			-1.33	

RM: The changes

Table: Key demographic groups: Routine Manual

	Population Share (%)			Fraction in RM (%)		
	1979	2014	Change	1979	2014	Change
<i>Male High School Dropouts</i>						
Age 20-29	1.90	0.89	-1.01	61.58	37.87	-23.70
Age 30-49	4.12	2.06	-2.06	63.19	48.94	-14.25
Age 50-64	4.68	1.51	-3.17	43.09	32.92	-10.17
<i>Male High School Graduates</i>						
Age 20-29	6.27	3.82	-2.45	61.36	34.99	-26.36
Age 30-49	7.51	6.60	-0.91	55.11	44.39	-10.72

- Overall share went down: From 25% to 15%

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Age 30-49	4.12	2.06	-2.06	63.19	48.94	-14.25
Age 50-64	4.68	1.51	-3.17	43.09	32.92	-10.17
<i>Male High School Graduates</i>						
Age 20-29	6.27	3.82	-2.45	61.36	34.99	-26.36
Age 30-49	7.51	6.60	-0.91	55.11	44.39	-10.72

- **Composition: Compounded by a fall in propensity to work in RM.**

RM: Where to?

Table: Δ in the Fraction of Workers in each Group, 1979-2014 (p.p.)

	NRC	RC	RM	NRM	Not Working
<i>Male High School Dropouts</i>					
Age 20-29	-1.10	2.16	-23.70	7.47	15.17
Age 30-49	-4.95	0.62	-14.25	9.02	9.55
Age 50-64	-6.31	-0.12	-10.17	2.66	13.95
<i>Male High School Graduates</i>					
Age 20-29	-3.81	5.22	-26.36	7.79	17.16
Age 30-49	-8.37	0.64	-10.72	5.32	13.13

The Who: RC

Table: Fraction of Δ in RC accounted for by demographic groups, 1989-2014

	Males			Females		
	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>
High School Diploma	-2.35	3.16	3.13	14.80	24.13	3.54
Some College	2.15	5.43	2.38	12.27	10.62	1.50
		<i>All Ages</i>			<i>All Ages</i>	
Less Than High School		0.65			3.37	
At Least College		8.75			6.46	

RC: The changes

Table: Key demographic groups: Routine Cognitive

	Population Share (%)			Fraction in RC (%)		
	1989	2014	Change	1989	2014	Change
<i>Female High School Graduates</i>						
Age 20-29	5.82	3.05	-2.77	32.61	22.73	-9.89
Age 30-49	10.58	5.57	-5.01	32.68	23.81	-8.87
<i>Females with Some College</i>						
Age 20-29	3.88	4.70	0.82	36.77	24.46	-12.31
Age 30-49	5.48	6.32	0.84	33.04	25.50	-7.54

RC: Where to?

Table: Δ in the Fraction of Workers in each Group, 1989-2014 (p.p.)

	NRC	RC	RM	NRM	Not Working
<i>Female High School Graduates</i>					
Age 20-29	-2.58	-9.89	-4.39	7.06	9.79
Age 30-49	-2.05	-8.87	-3.34	6.28	7.99
<i>Females with Some College</i>					
Age 20-29	-4.42	-12.31	-1.16	9.94	7.96
Age 30-49	-3.78	-7.54	-0.24	7.44	4.11
Notes: Data from the monthly Current Population Survey.					

Table: Observed and counterfactual changes in population shares (p.p.)

	Observed	Propensity	Change only in propensities of key groups
	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. 1979-2014			
Routine	-9.30	-7.67	-6.20
B. 1989-2014			
Routine	-9.37	-7.90	-5.68

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	Observed	Propensity	Change only in propensities of key groups
	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. 1979-2014			
Routine	-9.30	-7.67	-6.20
Non-Routine Manual	3.85	6.55	4.17
Non-Employment	-1.27	4.03	3.14
B. 1989-2014			
Routine	-9.37	-7.90	-5.68
Non-Routine Manual	2.71	4.68	2.81
Non-Employment	3.14	5.88	4.21

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B. 1989-2014			
Routine	-9.37	-7.90	-5.68
Non-Routine Manual	2.71	4.68	2.81
Non-Employment	3.14	5.88	4.21

- **Takeaway:** Key demographic groups that account for most of the change in routine employment also account for substantial fraction of observed changes in NRM and Non-Employment

Summary of Empirical Findings

- Fall in Routine can be traced to specific demographic groups
- Significant fraction of the fall is because of propensities change
- These same groups are also key in understanding the rise of non-employment and NRM
- Suggests link between that these long-run labor market changes

Model

Model

- Study a general, flexible model featuring:
 - Endogenous participation.
 - Occupational choice.
- Analytical analysis of automation effects on the labor market.
- Quantitative evaluation.
- Template for evaluation of automation and other channels.
- Generalization of Autor-Dorn (2013)

Key Insights from the Model


- Automation shock that substitutes routine workers will:
 - ① Induce workers to switch to manual jobs, because of changes in relative wages across occupations
 - ② Induce workers to leave employment, because of a decrease in the expected wage conditional on working

Key Insights from the Model

- Automation shock that substitutes routine workers will:
 - ① Induce workers to switch to manual jobs, because of changes in relative wages across occupations
 - ② Induce workers to leave employment, because of a decrease in the expected wage conditional on working
- **But:** the model features a **tradeoff between participation and occupational sorting changes**
 - Larger reallocation into the manual occupation requires lower elasticity of labor demand in manual jobs
 - But flatter labor demand implies smaller changes in expected wages and hence smaller changes in employment rates
 - A steeper labor demand in manual jobs increases impact on participation, but reduces impact on occupational change

Quantitative Results

Pareto Routine Ability; Zero Cross-Elasticities; Different Own-Elasticity Pairs ($\eta_{GR,R}, \eta_{GI \dots LM}$)



Target: Emp Rate 0.727 \rightarrow 0.649; Share Manual: 0.184 \rightarrow 0.309

Key Insights from the Model

- We estimate the magnitude of the automation shock based on data on ICT capital
- The estimated shock does not generate changes in employment and occupational shares as large as what we observe in the data
- This is true even when we allow for a wide range of parameters in the model
- Automation shock would have to be roughly twice as large as our estimate in order to match the changes in employment and occupational shares observed in the data
- Difficult to account for the changes solely through automation (as measured by ICT capital) in a standard neoclassical framework

Conclusions

Conclusions

- Fall in Routine can be traced to specific demographic groups
- Significant fraction of the fall is because of propensities change
- These groups have gone to NRM and Non-Employment
- Account for a significant fraction of the changes in NRM and Non-Employment
- We develop a general model of occupational choice and participation which can serve as a template for future analysis
- Flexible parametrization of basic neoclassical model struggles to jointly generate observed reallocation towards NRM and non-employment given observed automation shock

Future work

- What are the forces that account for our empirical findings?
- Concentrated solely on the impact of automation on routine and non routine wages and employment.
- Other (relevant?) changes observed in the U.S. economy
 - Changes in the share of high-skilled workers and their occupational choice
 - Outsourcing and trade
 - Policy changes affecting incentive to work